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Abstract. Living kidney donation provides a promising opportunity in situations where the scarcity of
cadaveric kidneys is widely acknowledged. While many patients and their relatives are willing to accept its
beneﬁts, others are concerned about living kidney programs; they appear to feel pressured into accepting
living kidney transplantations as the only proper option for them. As we studied the attitudes and views of
patients and their relatives, we considered just how actively health care professionals should encourage
living donation. We argue that active interference in peoples’ personal lives is justiﬁed – if not obligatory.
First, we address the ambiguous ideals of non-directivity and value neutrality in counselling. We describe
the main pitfalls implied in these concepts, and conclude that these concepts cannot account for the
complex reality of living donation and transplantation. We depict what is required instead as truthful
information and context-relative counselling. We then consider professional interference into personal
belief systems. We argue that individual convictions are not necessarily strong, stable, or deep. They may
be ﬂawed in many ways. In order to justify interference in peoples’ personal lives, it is crucial to understand
the structure of these convictions. Evidence suggests that both patients and their relatives have attitudes
towards living kidney donation that are often open to change and, accordingly, can be inﬂuenced. We show
how ethical theories can account for this reality and can help us to discern between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed
interference. We refer to Stephen Toulmin’s model of the structure of logical argument, the Rawlsian
model of reﬂective equilibrium, and Thomas Nagel’s representation of the particularistic position.
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Introduction
In most Western countries the waiting time for
cadaveric kidney transplantation has increased
dramatically. In the Netherlands this is 4.5 years
on average, with approximately 1,100 patients on
the waiting list and an alarming mortality-rate
among kidney patients (20% a year). This pressing
situation is similar in many other countries (Price,
2002; Gutmann et al., 2004). Health care profes-
sionals and health care policy makers have good
medical and ethical reasons to promote the many
options of living kidney donation (Hilhorst, 2005a;
Hilhorst et al., 2005b). This donation has impor-
tant advantages over cadaveric donation and
donor risks are low. Living kidney donation helps
patients to circumvent the waiting list and relieves
them of the burden of dialysis. Furthermore, the
kidney survival rates for living kidneys are signif-
icantly better (50% still functioning after 20 years;
for post-mortem organs this is only 10 years).
Indeed many patients seem to prefer living to
cadaveric donation (Kranenburg et al., 2005).
Facilitating any transplantation program also has
important societal implications, as the end stage
renal disease program consumes a considerable
amount of the health care resources, e.g. in the
Netherlands 1% of the health care-budget (De Wit
et al., 1998). Both policymakers and health care
professionals may therefore feel an obligation to
bring these facts to the attention of patients and
their relatives.
How actively, we ask, can or should this be
done in the clinic? What kind of professional
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able? In Norway, for instance, where the option
of kidney dialysis is not widely available, doctors
often take the initiative in contacting the families
of kidney patients to ask them explicitly to
consider living donation. Lennerling et al. (2004)
have stated that ‘‘Recruitment of the donor
represents a medical and moral responsibility.’’
But at what point is such interference viewed as
unjustiﬁed pressure? Living transplantation pro-
grams are increasingly taking place or being
proposed, e.g. cross-over and list exchange pro-
grams (Kranenburg et al., 2004; Segev et al.,
2005), altruistic (anonymous and non-anony-
mous) donations between strangers (Landolt
et al., 2003; Hilhorst, 2005a), and payment
arrangements accompanied by ethical constraints
(Steiner, 2004; Kishore, 2005). These develop-
ments make it even more necessary to evaluate
the counselling process and to ensure that the
information provided is clear and helpful and
does not deteriorate into propaganda. Moreover,
greater insight is needed into the attitudes and
beliefs of recipients and donors with respect to
living donation.
As part of several psychological investigations
(Kranenburg et al., 2005), we have contacted,
among others, patients in the process of living
kidney donation as well as patients on the waiting
list for kidney transplantation at our centre. We
studied the views of both patients and their
relatives (family members, partners, friends) with
respect to living kidney donation. We used
structured, semi-structured and in-depth interview
techniques to explore their knowledge of the topic
and the information they received (i.e. risk per-
ception, attitude, communication, family system,
mutuality of personal relationships and views on
the eﬀect of a transplantation on these relation-
ships). We tried to have them elicit the obstacles
to transplantation as they perceived them, and
possible measures that could be taken to remove
those obstacles. Do these patients and/or relatives
disapprove of the transplantation option? Are
they positive but unable to ﬁnd a donor? Do they
have diﬃculties communicating with relatives
about transplantation? Do they anticipate changes
in their relationship with their loved ones? Do
they need additional information? Are their fears
or anxieties speciﬁc enough to describe? Why do
they postpone making a decision, etc.? The results
of this investigation, which in itself was already
experienced by some as a far-reaching interfer-
ence, will be published elsewhere.
In this article, we focus on the justiﬁcation of
intervention in light of the needs and views of
patients and their relatives, as expressed with
regard to living donation and transplantation.
The article itself is structured as follows: given the
various obstacles that people encounter (par. 2),
and given the aim of professional interference
(par. 3), we describe the shortcomings of prevail-
ing professional ideals – non-directivity in coun-
selling and value neutrality of information – and
suggest another approach (par. 4). Then we go on
to discuss the justiﬁcation of interventions in
personal convictions and fundamental beliefs
(par. 5), and to portray the consequences for
the counselling process and conclude that coun-
sellors should be open to the particularities of a
situation and sensitive enough to appreciate the
moral weight of those particularities; moral lan-
guage appears to be necessarily ambivalent, and
general ethical concepts are inadequate (par. 6).
Obstacles: practical, fundamental and complex
Patients and their relatives initially encounter
many obstacles that keep them from offering or
receiving a kidney. Some of those obstacles are
purely practical and health care professionals can
often diminish or eliminate them. This might be
achieved by providing more information, or a
better explanation of the beneﬁts or risks of
transplantation, or a clearer view of the alterna-
tives, etc. Crucial, however, is the way in which this
information is presented (Oduncu, 2002).
Obstacles may also have a fundamental char-
acter. Some objections or doubts refer to funda-
mental beliefs; when, for instance, a potential
donor says: ‘‘I would not easily donate an organ
myself, because I believe that the human body should
remain a whole.’’ (NB: this and the following
citations, though based on our research, are
constructed depictions, for the sake of argument).
Views on man and the human body are frequently
reﬂected in terms of integrity or a telos (an ultimate
goal), such as ‘‘organs do belong – and are bound –
to this body, and are not meant for another’’, or the
view that living organs are not just a commodity:
‘‘We should not treat organs as merely a product
that has value independent of its natural locus.’’
(Shannon, 2001; De Castro, 2003). Other obstacles
have a more complex nature, for instance when a
potential recipient makes the observation that ‘‘I
would never ever accept a kidney from a relative,
because I am afraid that I will feel guilty when
MEDARD T. HILHORST ET AL. 82something goes wrong with my donor after the
transplantation.’’ Note that medical, psychological
and ethical considerations here are intertwined in a
complex way.
The crucial question is whether and under what
conditions it is acceptable to interfere in these
practical objections, fundamental beliefs and com-
plex convictions. We shall argue that fundamental
beliefs are open to change and that showing respect
for these beliefs does not necessarily imply that we
should not intervene.
The aim of interference
In health care, it is quite common to interfere in the
lives of individuals. Health care professionals make
decisions in patients’ best interests in situations
where they are not able to decide for themselves. In
general, however, kidney patients and their rela-
tives do not fall within this category. Justiﬁcation
of interventions is based on ‘patient empower-
ment’: health care professionals seek to support
patients and their relatives in making autonomous
decisions (Bergsma, 1997). The aim of interference
is to strengthen or restore the autonomy of patients
and their relatives, and therefore to enable them to
make well-informed judgments and be in control
(BMA, 2004). Interference is therefore justiﬁed in
the sense that it provides support and gives help.
Later we will take a look at what it means to
interfere in counselling, and more in particular, in
fundamental beliefs.
In addition, it could even be argued that it would
be unjust if some individuals took more advantage
of the living transplantation program than others,
simply because health care providers were not
helping to remove the obstacles that prevent more
reluctant patients and relatives from participating.
One particular feature of the situation, however,
complicates this picture. We should note that
concepts such as ‘support’ and ‘help’ may have a
very different meaning for patients than for poten-
tial donors. What beneﬁts do donors have when we
turn them into patients? Is not the best advice we
could give them that of staying away entirely from
the donation process in the ﬁrst place? We must ﬁnd
a way to deal with this double challenge.
Interference in counselling
Crucial issues in counselling concern the question
of what information is appropriate, and how this
information should be (re)presented. Prevailing
concepts of non-directivity and value neutrality
have shortcomings that make them unﬁt for
supplying adequate guidance. We will show why,
and suggest another approach.
Appropriate information is contextual and personal
Legislation requires that health care professionals
fully inform patients about all relevant facts with
respect to treatment and alternatives. The many
treatment options on offer include: dialysis, cadav-
eric transplantation, transplantation within and
outside families, and cross-over transplantation.
Each alternative has its own beneﬁts, disadvan-
tages and risks. The professional and moral obli-
gation to provide adequate and relevant
information is not limited to providing medical
facts. The obligation also includes the counselling
process as a whole. It is a health care worker’s duty
to help patients understand the information, and to
enable them to act accordingly. His/her concern
should be not only to simply provide the informa-
tion, but also to ensure that the patient has
understood properly. Intervention should try not
only to determine whether patients and their
relatives require any additional information, but
should also strive to correct misperceived informa-
tion. The aim is to provide support for the making
of well-considered judgements (Oduncu, 2002). In
the context of genetic counselling, it is acknowl-
edged that a right-not-to-know exists. Individuals
may have their own (good) reasons for not seeking
further information (or asking for it at a later
date). Their wishes should, of course, be respected.
This consideration places a clear moral and pro-
fessional constraint on all counselling. This con-
straint can only be established through open
communication, free from coercion, if patients
are willing to share their reasons, which is
obviously up to them.
A number of concepts are used to describe both
the threats and ideals implicit in the counselling
process. These include determining the point at
which free decisions become forced, deciding when
to apply less or more pressure, and differentiating
between inducement and persuasion. Other factors
that can harmfully affect behaviour may also
include, for instance, money (Goyal et al., 2002)
or gender (Biller-Andorno, 2002). ‘Value neutral-
ity’ is often put forward as the guiding criterion
with regard to the appropriate representation of
information. But what exactly is meant by this
concept, and can it be a guiding principle?
First of all, professionals should understand
that medical information in the context of a health
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so-called ‘pure’ facts will be understood within a
certain context, and may, in this setting, comprise a
moral appeal. For example, someone who calls out
‘‘She is bleeding to death’’, might also mean ‘‘We
must do something about this and prevent it’’. The
word ‘must’ is understood against the background
of a conviction, i.e. the view that lives should be
protected and saved, if possible, and that – as a
rule – we prefer life over death. A statement such as
‘‘Each year you wait for a kidney increases your
chances of dying’’, implies that ‘‘You’d better come
up with a living donor’’. These examples demon-
strate a second feature of providing information.
Since each piece of information is interpreted and
experienced within the context of a person’s views
and earlier experiences, information is always
person-relative. Questions such as ‘‘What repre-
sents a great risk?’’, ‘‘How great a burden is it to be
on a waiting list?’’, or ‘‘Should dying always be
prevented?’’, do not allow for objective answers
(i.e. scientiﬁc, quantitative, separated from person
or situation) but ultimately require a personal,
non-value-free response. Health care workers can
only help to ﬁnd this response when they accept
that the information they give is not neutral. Value
neutrality therefore seems not only impossible to
achieve, but is not even desirable.
Pitfalls in (re)presenting information
With regard to the counselling process, ‘non-
directiveness’ is generally cited as the ideal. But
what does it mean? We can explore the meaning by
pointing out some main pitfalls in counselling. The
above-mentioned observations about the context-
relative and person-relative character of informa-
tion provide the basis for what follows.
First of all, health care professionals are not
justiﬁed in providing directive counselling if it
means presenting facts in a one-sided, selective
way, and therefore (intentionally or otherwise)
underexposing some options while favouring oth-
ers. The issue is not that counsellors should be non-
directive, or that information should be presented
impartially or in a value neutral way. Presenting all
options as equally good alternatives ignores the
fact that, often, some options are simply better
than others, and there is no good reason not to say
so. Information should be truthful, not distorted
by personal prejudice or professional preference.
The option, for instance, of early, pre-emptive
transplantation (i.e. before a patient starts dialysis)
has many advantages over transplantation later on.
Counsellors who do not inform their patients
about this fact are providing biased information
and are making a serious mistake. But, at the same
time, they should acknowledge that all information
contains values. Professionals should try to deal
transparently and communicate these values
openly. Counsellors, if they endeavour to provide
truthful information, are more likely to be viewed
as trustworthy.
Secondly, health care professionals are not
justiﬁed in providing directive counselling if they
focus predominantly on the medical perspective,
consider this perspective to be the ‘most reason-
able’ and are blind to other perspectives. From the
patient’s perspective, considerations other than
purely medical ones may be highly relevant as
well; for example his/her relationship to the donor,
his/her social network, etc. Living transplantation
may, for instance, be ‘better’ than cadaveric
transplantation for a number of medical reasons,
but it is not self-evident that this medical perspec-
tive should be given more weight than other, i.e.
ethical, social, psychological, perspectives. Con-
versely, it would be equally mistaken to suggest
that a donor who is overweight does not represent
a greater risk. Again, the issues here are not non-
directiveness and value neutrality, but rather the
fair portrayal and explanation of the different ways
of evaluating and weighing these options.
We suggest that no one single objective descrip-
tion of ‘reality’ will sufﬁce. The presentation of ‘the
facts’ should provide patients and their relatives
with the tools to decide for themselves what they
think is best. It should be acknowledged that the
assessment of all information is ultimately a
personal one, in which the perspective of the donor
or recipient is decisive.
Thirdly, it would not be justiﬁed to provide
directive counselling by approaching potential
donors as merely a means to an end, instead of
showing them the respect they deserve. It would be
mistaken to argue that saving the life of a patient
(or relative) outweighs the relatively small risks
and disadvantages for the donor, because this view
overlooks alternative options and does not take
account of other viewpoints and considerations.
Respect for patients and their relatives implies
that relatives will be contacted if, and only if,
patients give their consent. Moreover, if health care
professionals are viewed as the advocates of their
patients, other advocates should also be appointed
to defend and to protect the interests of the
(potential) donors. In general, people can have
reasons of their own, by referring to the particu-
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donors as well may have their own good reasons
for not donating an organ. Professionals should
help donors to express their perspectives, consid-
erations and convictions. It should not be forgot-
ten that donors also have families and lives of their
own. For example, they may have doubts about the
health risks involved in donation, uncertainty
about their social situation, anxiety concerning
the implications for personal relationships, duties
towards others such as a partner or children,
loyalties with regard to their occupation, or other
commitments. Many of these concerns will be valid
and should be taken seriously.
Justiﬁed interference: issues to be solved
Within those constraints noted in sections 4a and
4b, however, there is room for justiﬁed interven-
tion. We have found, quite surprisingly, that, when
asked, more than 50% of the patients and their
relatives waiting for a kidney are open to the idea
that doctors, (with the patient’s consent) should
address relatives directly. Some patients feel con-
fused and threatened by the situation in which they
ﬁnd themselves. It is hard to imagine how these
patients are able to ask a relative to donate a
kidney. Many patients are afraid their relatives will
refuse, but mask their fear and ﬁnd reasons not to
ask them to donate (‘‘Given her situation, my
friend should not donate’’) or not to accept any
possible future offer (‘‘I am not prepared to live at
the expense of others’’). Psychological and ethical
issues are intertwined. This situation may be an
appropriate opportunity to interfere, as health care
professionals may be able to help the patient ﬁnd a
way out of this predicament. They can help patients
to distinguish reality from imagination, and to
disentwine their psychological defence mechanisms
from their true personal needs and moral consid-
erations. The counsellor, for example, might ask
the patient: ‘‘How can you be so sure that he
doesn’t want to donate if you haven’t discussed
it?’’, or ‘‘Why don’t you give your friends the
opportunity to decide for themselves whether they
wish to become your donor?’’, or even ‘‘Why don’t
you give your son the opportunity to help you?’’.
Given the apparent scope for justiﬁed interven-
tion, however, some important issues remain to be
solved.
First of all, should the patient’s doctor (or any
doctor) take the initiative to contact relatives, or
are other professionals, such as psychologists or
social workers, in a better position to do so? And
should we ﬁnd these experts within or outside the
transplantation centres? Much depends on the
emphasis one wants to put on the medical per-
spective, and the faith one has in doctors. And
what role can patient organizations have in
empowering patients and their relatives?
Secondly, what exactly should be the role of
experts or support groups: to mediate between
patient and potential donors, or to represent either
the patient or the potential donor? To provide
basic information, to offer counselling in a partic-
ular situation, or to refer to other experts for
decision-making (through mediation, pastoral
counselling, etc.)?
Thirdly, a health care professional must provide
support for patients and their potential donors in
light of their distinct needs. The interests of patients
and their donor-relatives do not necessarily coin-
cide, and may even be at odds. In a transplantation
program it is important to decide at what point in
the counselling process we should consider a
patient and his/her relative(s) as a single unit, and
at what point we should treat them as individuals
with their own personal needs and wishes. If we
assume that each relationship has its own unique
characteristics, and that interests can overlap, it is
far from self-evident where the interests of one
individual end and the interests of the other begin.
It seems that this not only requires clear and formal
safeguards (e.g. by assigning potential donors their
own personal health advocate), but also sensitivity
to the fundamental needs of both parties on the
part of health care professionals.
This is not just a practical issue. We believe that
the impact of transplantation on close relationships
requires more conceptual clariﬁcation. Patient and
donor may, as we have said before, have strong
common interests. There are disadvantages (health
risks) for the donor, but also beneﬁts from the
transplantation. For example, transplantation may
relieve donors of the burden of caring for the
patient, they may regain a healthy partner, have
better prospects of a future with their relative, or it
may give them the feeling that they are being
altruistic, etc. Yet this raises questions to which
there are no easy answers. Should donors feel a
duty to donate? Should donors also have beneﬁts,
and if no such beneﬁts are present, should their
offer to donate be refused? Or should donors
accept at least some form of payment? Should a
donation be based on altruism, or does the
principle of reciprocity offer more solid moral
ground? Or is a motivation based on the donor’s
self-interest the better option? Should one say that,
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outweigh the harm to the donor and his/her
family, as is claimed for cadaveric donation?
Another pitfall of counselling assumes that one
simple unequivocal answer can be appropriate for
these complex questions – that there is a mono-
lithic view available concerning morality and
personal relations. As we will show, unique rela-
tionships and particular situations require their
own answers. In explaining this, we will refer in
what follows to the structure of fundamental
beliefs and personal convictions, and conclude
that general ethical concepts cannot fully account
for the richness of moral experience.
Interference in fundamental beliefs
The structure of fundamental beliefs and personal
convictions can be pictured in accordance with a
number of models. Here we describe three such
models, referring to well-known theories by Ste-
phen Toulmin, John Rawls and Thomas Nagel,
and ask whether interference in fundamental
beliefs and personal convictions can be justiﬁed.
We use these models in an heuristic way. All three
represent ways of moral reasoning that exist
alongside each other in everyday life, and can help
counsellors to be sensitive to the strengths and
weaknesses of these beliefs and convictions.
A deductive model
In a deductive model, as described by Stephen
Toulmin, a conviction can be represented by a
general principle or axiom that is applied in a
particular situation. We may expect the logic of
reason also to be valid for ethics (Baier, 1966;
Toulmin et al., 1979). For example:
Principle: ‘‘One should not cut in a healthy body’’
Fact: ‘‘In transplantation surgery – as well as
in cosmetic surgery – one has to cut in a
body that is healthy’’
Inference: ‘‘Therefore, I reject this surgery’’
This logical conclusion is not as strong and stable
as it seems, and this belief (axiom) less deep and
fundamental than one might think at ﬁrst sight.
Often people will be prepared to adjust their views,
for various reasons, and in a number of ways:
– by qualifying the fact, e.g. ‘‘Kidney transplanta-
tion is a necessity, cosmetic surgery is merely a
luxury, and sterilization is sometimes a good
option.’’
– by limiting the principle, or its sphere of inﬂuence
‘‘One should never cut in a healthy body, unless
something good can be accomplished by it.’’
– by specifying the conclusion ‘‘If the beneﬁts out-
weigh the disadvantages, I can accept organ
transplantation.’’
– by introducing or referring to another funda-
mental principle: ‘‘the principle of beneﬁcence
for me has priority over the principle of bodily
integrity; this principle of charity should be ulti-
mately decisive.’’
The insight which this model gives provides us with
a justiﬁcation for intervention: beliefs are not ﬁxed,
but dynamic, and should not be taken at face
value. Interferences can contribute by helping
patients and their relatives to reﬁne the argument
and give their views a more strong and stable
character.
A network model
The network theory, borrowed from John Rawls,
holds the view that the basis of our moral beliefs is
not founded on ﬁxed and solid ground. Instead of
searching for ultimate principles or fundamental
axioms, we should look at moral justiﬁcation in a
different way. The concept of coherence can
explain how a moral point of view is comprised
of various parts. Each view consists of a great
number of ingredients: innumerable and very
diverse facts, ethical principles, moral intuitions,
experiences, values, considerations, etc. When we
try to take a stand, what we usually do in everyday
life is look for sufﬁcient (internal) coherence
(Rawls, 1971; Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg,
1998). For example, a patient says ‘‘I would happily
accept a kidney from my partner (unfortunately he
does not match), but not from my daughter. I could
live with the small risk for my spouse, as with other
risks in life, like his mountaineering, but not with the
risks for my daughter. At this moment we are happy
with my dialysis and my nephrologist is content with
how things are going.’’
In everyday life, we try to bring the various
considerations together and obtain a more or less
coherent picture of our situation. Considerations
back each other up and strengthen one another
mutually. This coherence is shaped in a dynamic,
reﬂective process, in which facts are qualiﬁed,
principles are limited and positioned vis-a ` -vis
each other, moral intuitions are reconsidered,
and provisional conclusions are speciﬁed. The
aim is to give fair consideration to as many
elements as possible. One can refer here to a
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may be replaced after reﬂection by a more
stable, well-considered judgement. In this process,
(even) fundamental convictions are open to
change. The example above may continue as
follows:
– initial preference: ‘‘We appreciate dialysis at home
(because my partner’s kidney does not match).’’
– new fact: ‘‘Our doctor has told us that we can
take part in a cross-over programme.’’
– moral intuition: ‘‘I ﬁnd it hard to accept the idea
of receiving a kidney from a stranger, with its po-
tential, unknown risk.’’
– basic value: ‘‘My partner, who is a doctor, is pre-
pared to donate cross-over; he wants me to have
conﬁdence in this programme.’’
– experience: ‘‘I am, however, afraid of disappoint-
ment and do not want to cross this barrier; more-
over, I have heard that blood group 0-patients,
like myself, do not match very well and have little
chance of successfully receiving a kidney trans-
plantation.’’
– new fact: ‘‘My sister-in-law said at a birthday
party that she was willing to donate a kidney to
me. However, I’m not sure how serious she was
in saying this; she had already had a few drinks.’’
– moral intuition: ‘‘I think that I would prefer a
kidney from my sister-in-law.’’
– new fact: ‘‘My son has found a reliable address
abroad where one can get a kidney from a stran-
ger in exchange for money; we have the money,
and this would at least eliminate the risk for my
partner.’’
– moral intuition: ‘‘If I accept a kidney from a
stranger, I would prefer this to cross-over.’’
– well-considered judgement: ‘‘So far, my experience
with dialysis is ﬁne and I consider cross-over to
be taking things one step too far. I will wait to
see what the future brings. My daughter has two
young children who need their mother, my son
has his own small business to run, and my rela-
tionship with my daughter-in-law has never been
perfect. I’m reluctant to talk to my sister-in-law
about her oﬀer, maybe it’s better to wait and see
whether she brings it up again. My son is proba-
bly right that the better option can be found
abroad. At the moment, all is going well, we
should leave it as it is.’’
This personal judgement is provisional, but well-
considered. It is the temporal close of a reﬂective
process that never ends, as it is open to new facts
and circumstances. For now it has balanced the
various options.
This second model also provides a justiﬁcation
for intervention. Counsellors can see it as their role
to keep the communication with patients and their
relatives open. They can look for elements that can
be reconsidered and take the initiative to open the
discussion about these elements. They can try to
give their support, if requested, in instances where
facts are biased, views distorted, certain perspec-
tives underestimated, and where room exists for
new considerations. The network model can
account for the dynamics of moral beliefs and the
process character of moral reﬂection. It may help
to understand the counselling process as a truly
reﬂective process.
An agent-relative model
In the third model it is emphasized, for instance
by Nagel (1986), that particularistic values also
play a part in everyday morality, in addition to
general ethical premises and principles. Individu-
als often have (good) reasons of their own,
reasons that are highly personal in nature. These
reasons reﬂect unique situations and personal
commitments. They are by deﬁnition partial, in
the sense that not every perspective is given
impartial weight. Partial considerations can make
up the core argument in moral judgements
(Hooker and Little, 2003). They can bear signiﬁ-
cant weight. Take expressions such as ‘‘I choose
to donate just because ...’’:
– ‘‘I love her.’’
– ‘‘he is my mate.’’
– ‘‘ her life is the only thing that matters to me.’’
– ‘‘I would never forgive myself if I didn’t donate to
my sister’’.
Or, ‘‘I choose not to donate because’’ ...:
– ‘‘I have responsibilities towards my little son, who
is totally dependent on me’’
– ‘‘I have duties towards the people I have employed
in my new business.’’
– ‘‘I live for my professional career (Olympic syn-
chronic swimming).’’
– ‘‘I think my niece is in a much better position to
donate.’’
These arguments can be called ‘person-relative’,
because they are in a unique way connected to
the person who utters them. Various websites
recall these unique stories (http://www.livingdo-
nors.org). They do not express general moral
truths, applicable to all others in the same
situation, but a reality that is only true for the
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tures of the situation turn out to be morally
signiﬁcant. Signiﬁcant for this person (actor,
‘agent’) are loyalties to particular individuals,
commitments to certain personal projects or
ideals, or coincidental circumstances, like the
existence of a vulnerable niece.
This ‘agent’-relative model seems to govern the
morality of personal relationships and is highly
relevant in the context of kidney disease. The
strong appeal to potential donors who live in a
patients’ surroundings induces unique personal
responses. Agent-relative considerations, more
than all others, seem particularly decisive. A
general rule like ‘‘One should not let one’s soul
mate die’’ or ‘‘Partners have caring duties towards
each other, as part of their marital bond’’ is not the
leading principle, but personal commitments and
loyalties such as ‘‘As far as I am concerned, I will
not let my partner down’’. Thus a general principle
of beneﬁcence (doing well) or maleﬁcence (doing
harm) is not applied, but a particular moral point
of view is expressed, based on a highly personal
ideal about what constitutes the particular good.
Donors may refer either to what is perceived as
good for a sick relative, or to the donor’s own
moral self-image, or to the unique relationship
with the recipient.
To be able to understand someone’s choice,
health care professionals need to understand these
ideals and the commitments and loyalties they
represent. It may seem that these agent-relative
views are less open to change and that counsellors
can do nothing but simply comply with them.
Does this imply that interventions are not justiﬁed
within this model? To draw such a conclusion
would be to misunderstand the agent-relative
perspective. Agent-relative reasons are embedded
in views about personal and moral identity
(Hooker and Little, 2003; Sie et al., 2004) and
therefore have their own justiﬁcation. This iden-
tity is not something ﬁxed and closed to all
consideration. The justiﬁcation of a position
commonly takes the form of a narrative, a
personal story, that can be more or less coherent
and constant over time. Counsellors can take part
in the shaping of this story, and in the identity
formation of a patient or donor struggling with
living transplantation (if, of course, the patient or
donor wants such help and is open to it). An open
discussion pays in fact tribute to the autonomy of
agents. Agents, capable to consider reasonable
arguments and willing to reconsider their views,
will emerge stronger than before.
Counselling: inadequate concepts, but open minds
The agent-relative model can explain why many
general ethical concepts – commonly used with-
out much thought – are inadequate. In the
context of personal relations, these concepts seem
to lose their unambiguous, self-evident, ordinary
meaning. This is true even for core concepts.
What precisely is meant by a ‘‘free choice for
living donation’’, a ‘‘voluntary decision’’, ‘‘an
option worth considering’’, a ‘‘moral duty’’, an
‘‘altruistic gift’’, a ‘‘natural and self-evident act’’,
a ‘‘reciprocal transaction’’, a ‘‘motivation based
on self-interest’’, etc? In this context, it seems, a
very different moral logic applies. Take a mother
who can save her child’s life by donating part of
her liver. What do we mean when we stipulate
that hers must be a free, voluntary gift? However
ambiguous it may be, this is something health
care professionals should ascertain. Interestingly,
in everyday life we ﬁnd a moral language that is
necessarily ambivalent. The sense that neither of
the characterizations mentioned above (free
choice, self-evident act, moral duty, reciprocity,
etc.) is entirely adequate is due to the fact that
our minds and moral experience are open to the
many particularities of a situation. Our prevailing
general concepts cannot fully account for this. In
people’s utterances we can detect moral intuitions
that are authentic and double-edged at the same
time:
– A parent: ‘‘I felt I had no choice, but it gave me a
good feeling that I could donate and help my child;
I took responsibility; I didn’t feel like a victim of
the situation; I took an active part in the process.’’
– A friend: ‘‘Of course, one has the choice, whether
or not to donate; but I would not have forgiven my-
self if I had not done it; it was an inevitable duty.’’
– A sister: ‘‘It is only natural to help; this is simply
what you do. I did not give it much thought. It has
nothing to do with duties.’’
– A child: ‘‘It’s both free and not free; she would
have done it – reciprocally – for me.’’
– A partner: ‘‘Is it altruism? I don’t know; I do it
for him, and I do it for myself. It’s easier to live
with a healthy spouse than with a sick one; it’s
good for us both.’’
– A doctor: ‘‘We should do this for each other, when
risks are low. I believe that ethics demands that we
consider it as a deadly serious option.’’
– A son: ‘‘I would help my father. Fortunately, I
have never had to consider donating a kidney seri-
ously, because he doesn’t want to talk about it.’’
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refer to what is morally at stake. It would be a
mistake to think that ethics can and should be
combined in one unambiguous language. This
would reduce the richness of moral life (Cunning-
ham, 2001).
The third model not only opens our eyes to
this richness, (the second model does this, too),
but also distinguishes between an internal and
external moral perspective. Whereas the external
perspective applies to general concepts, the inter-
nal perspective is more sensitive to the particular
morally signiﬁcant features of a situation. Both
can differ considerably, and cannot easily be
reconciled. Without going into the precise rela-
tionship that both perspectives should have with
each other, we can reasonably conclude that
general principles or social norms cannot give a
full and adequate description, but should at least
be augmented by more particularistic, personal
pictures of the moral reality. Counsellors should
therefore be open to these particularities of a
situation, and sensitive enough to appreciate their
moral weight.
Conclusion
We have argued that interference in peoples’
personal lives is justiﬁed – if not obligatory. This
interference, however, can easily become unjusti-
ﬁed pressure. We have shown, ﬁrst of all, that
prevailing concepts in counselling, i.e. value neu-
trality and non-directiveness – given the pitfalls
they imply – cannot account for the complex
reality of living donation and transplantation and
have only limited value as guiding principles in
living organ donation. What is required instead is
truthful information and counsellors people can
trust. In addition, adequate information and effec-
tive counselling should be context- and person-
relative, in order to respect the particularities of
each case.
Secondly, we have shown that interference with
personal belief systems can be justiﬁed. Views are
open to change and can, accordingly, be inﬂu-
enced. Ethical theories account for this dynamic
reality in different ways. They can help to discern
between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed interference.
We recommend a heuristic use of the models
offered. A patient’s personal view or belief may be
better represented by one model than by another.
A sensitive counsellor can make use of this insight
and look for the model’s potential openness for
change (Toulmin), and for deliberation (Rawls). It
might seem that Nagel’s model is less open to
external consideration, but this does not mean that
counsellors have no role in the matter. They can
support patients, if they wish, in their shaping of a
personal story and in their (dynamic) identity
formation. Nagel’s representation of the particu-
laristic position takes into account the richness of
moral reality, and suggests that health care pro-
fessionals should not reduce moral language to the
general ethical concepts that often prevail but be
sensitive to the particularities of a situation and
appreciate their moral weight.
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